Self"control is defined in relation to current goals of an organism. Working memory capacity (WMC)
self-regulation. Self-regulation is closely related to self-control, except that the "correct answer"
is not clearly defined. Self-regulation and self control must interact in important ways, and we suggest that working memory capacity supports both of these functions. In this paper we explore the implications of this line of reasoning and suggest how individual differences in working memory capacity might be related to individual differences in the ability to exercise self-control and to self-regulate.
A goal is a reference point around which behav ior is organized. Self-control becomes relevant when a person has to make a choice between actions that lead to incompatible goals. Experimental psy chologists study how people handle this problem in special situations where the correct choice is defined by the experimenter. When incorrect choices are reflexive, habitual, or salient, then an individual must resist these sources of interference to ultimately make correct choices. To the extent that he or she is successful, the person has main tained good self-control. Otherwise the person has ceded some degree of control to the interfering stimulus or habit.
We are interested in the mental processes that enable a person to deal with interference and distraction to avoid passing control outside the self. These processes depend on executive control, "the process by which the mind repro grams itself' (Logan, 2004, p. 227) . In our dis cussion of how working memory might support self-control we emphasize the function of selec tion, "the very keel on which our mental ship is built" (James, 1890, p. 680) . Working memory maintains access to relevant information and suppresses irrelevant information. We believe the selective function of working memory is important for mental control generally and self control particularly when a person is tempted to pursue conflicting goals. First we discuss working memory capacity in terms of selective attention and memory processes, mainly in the contexts of laboratory situations in which the experimenter defines both the interference and the goaL Afterward we explore possible links to cognitive control problems that are examined out of concern for psychological health and well-being.
MENTAL

WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY: BACKGROUND
The study of individual differences in wor king memory capacity was initiated with the deve l opment of the reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) , intended to measure the abil ity to simultaneously store and process infor mation. Individuals read a series of sentences for comprehension and attempt to remember the final word of each sentence for later testing.
Daneman and Carpenter showed that perfor mance on the reading span task correlated with a measure of complex cognition (reading com prehension) but performance on a simple word span task did not. Numerous variations on the reading span procedure have been devised, referred to collectively as complex span tasks.
In the operation span task (Turner & Engle, 1989; Unsworth et al., 2005) to those who had scored high (high spans) in the antisaccade procedure (Hallett, 1978) .
Participants must inhibit a reflexive-orienting response to an attention-capturing, sudden-on set stimulus, to quickly and accurately perform a simple task such as detecting a letter subse quently appearing in a different location. Low spans were slower and less accurate to detect letters appearing in a location opposite to a flashing stimulus than high spans were. High and low spans did not differ in detecting letters that app eared in the same location as a flashing stimulus (prosaccade condition). In Unsworth, Sch rock, and Engle (2004), the experimental t ask entailed merely looking away from the flashi ng stimulus in antisacccade conditions, or tow ard it in prosaccade conditions. Eye tracking dat a showed that low spans were more likely to inco rrectly look first toward, rather than away fro m, the abrupt-onset stimulus in antisaccade con ditio ns. Low spans also were slower than hig h sp ans to initiate correct eye movements a way from the stimulus. As in the study by Kane 
Stroop
In the studies by Kane and Engle (2003) high and low-span participants were instructed to name the color in which a color-word appeared (Stroop, 1935) . On incongruent trials, the color word was different from the color in which it appeared. On congruent trials, the color-word and color matched. Measures of interference were derived by comparing response times and errors on incongruent trials to those on congru ent trials. Low-span individuals showed more Stroop interference than high spans, suggest ing that low-span individuals were less able to maintain the goal to name the color, par ticularly when that goal was only weakly sup ported by the environment. To more fully test this hypothesis, Kane and Engle (2003) varied the proportion of incongruent trials across blocks. They reasoned that the goal of naming the color would be easier for low spans to main tain in blocks in which incongruent trials were more frequent because such trials could serve to remind the goal (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979) . Therefore, differences in interference effects between span groups should be reduced. In I t I . 
Comparison of Successive Visual Arrays
Control of attention allows high spans to restrict access to immediate memory, protecting to-be remembered information from interference from irrelevant material (Engle, 2002 
WoRKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND CONTROLLED RETRIEVAL
Individuals differing in working memory capac ity also differ in the ability to selectively focus on goal-relevant information and ignore goal· irrelevant information, even in situations where memory demand is low. In many cases there is only one critical thing to remember, the goal of the task. The next section focuses on studies that have examined working memory capac ity in terms of controlled, effortful retrieval, in contexts rich in interference.
Proactive Interference
One kind of interference in memory that has been extensively studied is called proactive inter ference (Wickens, Born, & Allen, 1963) . This refers to reduced learning during the course of a memory experiment resulting from interfere nce from earlier learned items. Recall declines when people are exposed to successive lists composed of words from the same category (e.g., farm ani mals). Individual differences in working memory capacity predict susceptibility to proactive inter ference (Kane & Engle, 2000; Rosen & Engle, 1998) . Proactive interference can be demon strated in scores from complex span tasks used to measure working memory capacity, and correla tions with intellectual abilities are reduced when complex span lists are manipulated to reduce proactive interference (Bunting, 2006) .
Low spans in the studies by Kane and Engle (2000) showed greater decrements in recall across lists than high working memory capac ity individuals. Participants were also required to perform an attention-demanding, finger-tap ping task during list encoding, recall, or both. This additional mental-motor load caused high span individuals to show proactive interference effects equivalent to low spans regardless of when the load was imposed. This suggested that high working-memory-capacity individuals normally used executive control processes unavailable to low-capacity individuals to resist proactive inter ference, but such control processes were no lon ger available to high spans when under a load.
Rosen and Engle (1998) tested high and low spans with lists of paired-associates in A-B, A-C, A-B form. High spans were faster to reach criterion learning and produced fewer first-list intru sions than low spans when learning the second list (A-C) that shared cues with the first list (A-B). High spans were slower than other high spans in a control condition to relearn the A-B list when presented a second time after learn ing the A-C list. These results were pro pose d to reflect suppression of the earlier list by high spans (Rosen & Engle, 1998) . Conversely, low -cap acity individuals were faster to relearn the A-B list than their matched controls, sug gest ing an ironic benefit from not doing the men tal work necessary to combat interference Whi le learn ing the A-C list. r ICip ants in Cantor and Engle (1993) were sho wn lists of sentences to study for later recognition memory testing in the fan paradigm (Anderson, 1974) . Some sentences uniquely mapped persons to places-for example, "The artist is in the house." Learning sentences that together violated one-to-one mapping-for example, "The fireman is in the store; the fire man is in the zoo; the doctor is in the house" created fan interference, which increases with increasing cue-overlap. Generally when people are shown the studied and new sentences for recognition, response times are slower and people make more errors as fan increases. In Cantor and Engle (1993) individual differences in fan-related slowing were strongly related to working memory capacity. So much so in fact, that the two measures redundantly predicted verbal aptitude in regression analyses. Unsworth and Engle (20Q7; 2006b) proposed that individual differences in working memory capacity reflect the contributions of two pro cesses: (I) active maintenance of information in an attention-like primary memory and (2) controlled, cue-driven retrieval from a second ary memory. A participant in a memory experi ment is able to code his or her experiences as belonging to a global context (or experimental context), a list context, or an item-level context. Contextual features or attributes are associ ated in secondary memory with the attributes of the to-be-remembered list items. Contextual levels may be distinguished by their specific ity along the temporal dimension. When it is time to retrieve the needed information, par ticipants use retrieval cues to point with greater or lesser precision at the context in which the information was encoded. Similar proposals are found in many existing memory models (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) .
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY As
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MEMORIES
Over-general retrieval cues result in the inclu sion of irrelevant information in the searched areas of secondary memory, resulting in more forgetting. Low-span individuals suffer more from proactive and other kinds of interference because they fail to constrain search of second ary memory to relevant information. Consistent 
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY, SELF-CONTROL, AND SELF-REGULATION
We have sketched a picture in which individual differences in working memory capacity reflect individual differences in the interrelated abili ties to selectively attend and remember infor mation, and use that information effectively to achieve simple goals defined within controlled experimental environments. We believe that such abilities are critical for living successfully outside the laboratory as well. In this section we review three ways the construct of working memory capacity has been applied to questions about controlling the contents of the mind: (1) retrieving autobiographical memories, (2) sup pressing unwanted thoughts, and (3) keeping the mind from wandering. We conclude by examining working memory capacity in a situ ation requiring bona fide self-control.
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND THE
SELF-MEMORY SYSTEM
The self is undoubtedly a powerful organiz ing framework for memories. Macrae and Roseveare (2002) showed that self-oriented memories were relatively immune to retrieval induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) compared to memories oriented toward other people. If accessible, autobiographical memories can be used to support current goal seeking . Disorders of over-general autobiographical memory retrieval have been associated with clinical problems like depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (Brewin, 1998) as well as diminished working memory capacity and problem-solving ability . In the Autobiographical Memory Test (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) , participants are shown lists of word cues and MENTAL are asked to respond to each cue by report i n g a specific memory (an event occurring at a par tic ular place and time, lasting less than one da y ) . Errors other than omissions are judge d inc or.
rect with respect to one of these two requ ire ments. ("' always enjoyed going to the beach " is too general because it does not specify a par. 2007) erred by recalling too many specific a utob iographical memories, but they should not have been able to do this at all according to the theory of over-general autobiographical mem ories outlined above. These results suggest a g e neral observation: Working memory capac it y will be helpful for producing a memory on dem and, whether the goal is to produce a series of very general memories (e.g., name all the ani mals you can think of that start with the letter "f") or very specific ones (e.g., name all the cit ies yo u hav e visited this year and when). Brewin and Beaton (2002) studied the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts in relation to work ing memory capacity and intelligence using the "White Bear" paradigm (Wegneret a!., 1987).
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND SUPPRES SING UNWANTED THOUGHTS
Participants were left alone in a room to continu ously verbalize their thoughts over three consec utive sessions. In the first session, participants were just instructed to freely verbalize. Before the second session participants were instructed not to think about white bears and to report any such thoughts (suppression condition). Before the third session, participants were instructed to think about white bears and report the occur rence of such thoughts (expression condition).
Working memory capacity and intelligence were negatively related to the number of reports of white bear thoughts in the suppression con dition but not in the expression condition.
Generalizing these results, Brewin and Smart (2005) found working memory capacity-related differences in intrusive thoughts of a more per sonally relevant nature, independent of mood.
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND MIND WANDERING
An alternative approach to suppressing unwanted thoughts is to practice mindfulness (Silananda, 2002) . Trying to suppress unwanted thoughts can ironically cause them to persist (Wegner, 1997) . Instead of trying to fight off intrusive thoughts, invite them to stay as your guest and they will lose their power to domi nate the mind (Silananda, 2002) . The oppo site of remaining mindful is to let one's mind wander. "Mind wandering represents a state of decoupled attention because, instead of pro cessing information from the external envi ronment, our attention is directed toward our own private thoughts and feelings" (Smallwood, Fishman, & Schooler, 2007) . Kaneet al. (2007) used an experience-sampling methodology to look at whether working memory capacity is related to frequency of task-unrelated thoughts.
Reports of task-unrelated thoughts were moder ated by working memory capacity when people 
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY AND IMPULSIVE DECISION MAKING
Delay discounting is a choice situation for study ing self-control (Rachlin, 2000) . Participants are offered hypothetical choices between two sums of money. The smaller sum is available imme diately but the larger one is not available until after a specified delay. People consistently pre fer the smaller-sooner reward to the larger-later one (Rachlin, 2000) . A measure of the degree to which a person is impulsive and "myopic" regarding future consequences can be obtained by offering various sums at various delays and plotting the individual's discounting function (Rachlin, 2000; p. 10).
Working memory capacity has seemed like a plausible source of variation across individu als in delay discounting and related "gambling" tasks (Fellows & Farah, 2005; Frank & Claus, 2006) . Like the flash in the antisaccade task (Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004) or the drink now as opposed to sobriety over time (Rachlin, 2000) , the small but immediate reward may serve as a salient cue that requires executive MENTAL control to resist (Stout et al., 2005 
